In recounting how the Kennedy Administration formulated Its policy toward the Cuban missile crisis, Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett (1952) ranked Secretary of State Dean Rusk's off-hand comment that "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked" as a classic in American diplomatic history. .4ccording to Alsop and Bartlett, the Secretary's observation captured the essence of the most explosive moment in the cold war. The momentum of Soviet-American Interaction had so activated the "engines of war" that the superpowers were carried perilously close to the brink of nuclear disaster before one of the nuclear Titans stepped back. For their parts, both President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev seemed to recognize that ;f they acted hastily or without measured restraint an awful doom threatened the entire world,--indeed history Itself.
The October crisis of 1962 was propelled by a pervasive force in human affairs,--namely a threat dynamic. The driving concern for prominent political leaders was the threat of an adverse future given present conditions or trends. Cues from the environment a.-e Interpreted Lo suggest that the situation anticipates a future condition of severe depivation, more than likely Involving some form of physical harm, The prevalence of negative signals heralding the advent of an unpropitious future stimulates systems to take action to avert the anticipated state of undesirability.
The Impending event precipitates the formation and Implementation of tactics designed to steer the course of events away from the projected danger. President Kennedy read the presence of Soviet medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on Cuba as portendlng an adverse futurc that should, If at all possible, be avoided.
He Interpreted the situation as demanding strategies to neutralize, dissipate, or avert the prospects of such an unwanted condition.
In announcing his Intention to 'mose a naval quarantine and demanding the removal of the missiles, Kennedy (1969) noted: "Should these offensive military prepa~ations continue, thus Increasing the threat to the hemisphere, furthe7 action will be justified. (McClelland, 1961; Tanter, 1967; McCormick, 1973; 1'75) .
International event analysis takes the position that regular behavior between national systems delineates the character of the Interaction system. Changes In the patterns of Interaction reflect changes In the International situation. Consequently the analytic task Is to ,ronitor the flow of events between national systems to Identify both the pattern of regularity In the event/interactlons and its change dynamic. This Information can then be used to Index the various behavioral modes of the International action system. Here, international event analysis Is used as a strategy to identify the patterns of pre-crisis behavior, of selected antagonistic states, to determl-e the regularities in the behavior, the propensity to change, and the threat content.
To Increase the International event analysis model's sensitivity to international threat situations, a cognitive appraisal element is attache' to the basic event analysis perspective. The logic follows rather routinely from the research; on stress by Lazarus (1966), Withey (1962, 93-123; 1964) and others,--namely that threats arise by inferring, or in the case of an Issued threat being told, that present conditions or trends are Intimately linked with some Impending disaster. In effect, threats and the behavior associated with them, relate directly to the expectation of harm, danger, adversity, and deprivation, sometime In the future. "The notion of threat specifically Implies that the noxious stimuli are not actually present. Only the cues heralding their coming are Involved" (Withey, 1962, 91) . As indicated by Withey, before a threat dynamic Is operative, the relationship between present conditions or trends and future dangers must be recognized. The expectation that danger Is approaching must be present before It is reasonable to assume that the affected system Is (1) actually threatened, meaning that the approaching confrontation Is viewed with apprehension and preferably should not be experienced (2) acting to avert, neutralize or dissipate the possibility of an unwanted Future. Tne cognltive appraisal dimension of this study serves as a means for determining the presence of this expectation among experienced observers of world affairs. Impartial measure of the Interaction behavior which is not viewed as threatening, but which results in unwanted consequences. In other words, it helps to recognize the cognitively unrecognized threat situation.
The end product sought using this strategy of Investigation is a compilation of empirical findings describing how patterns of International conflict change and become International crises, he theoretical expectation is that the threat dynamic is a significant force propelling conflicts to their crisis levels.
Guided by this expectation, the study attempts to delineate the behavioral characteristics most commonly associated with the transformation of a threat situation to a crisis situation. The result is an aggregation of empirical findings describing the "explosive mlx" of factors most likely to lead to a crisis. Such Information Is indispensible to an understanding of how crises arise, how they can be detected at their earliest stage of development as well as how they can be managed.
The
Intellectual pre-occupatlon of this Inquiry is to know more about the International interaction typically evoked when external events are either appraised as threatening, or are in fact stress-inducing, and disruptive. The basic theoretical orientation posits that national systems,
Indeed almost all open systems, are constantly confronted with external threat situatlons with which they must cope. An international crisis arises from the presence of such stimuli (Hermann, 1969a; 1972b, 3-17;  1972c, 187-211; Robinson, 1972, 20-35) .
In keeping with. this orientation the most critical research question Is:
1. What patterns of event/interaction characterize the pre-crisis Dehavlor of antagonistic national systems?
Obviously the empirical objective of thIs question is to ferret out the regularities in the intera-tion sequences during the period prior to a crisis. S!r.ce the context, Issues, participants, location, duration, tempo, and role vfintermedlarles are highly variable items, the expected area of meaningful comparability across crises is the interaction patterns. As threatening events unfold, it Is expected that national systems will adopt sequential strategies to nullify the approach of a negative future. The International event analysis model assumes that patterns of behavior can be identified for pre-crisis periods and distinguished from non-pre-crisis periods. Tanter (1972, 13) correctly asserts that McClelland's basic notion "is that events in conflicts might form a chain of Interaction sequences, and the discovery of these sequences would permit comparisons across cases." But while this Information is extremely Important, the more demanding research task is embodied In the second research question which seeks to unearth the threat content of the pre-crisis interaction.
Considerable empirical evidence exists to support the commonly held belief that the threat of harm is worse than the actual experience of It (Cook & Barnes, 1964; Janis, 1951; Mechanic, 1962) . This research emphasizes the distinction between the threat of harm and the actual confrontation with It. Behavioral responses in anticipation of an unwanted event are different from those responses undertaken in the face of the actual event. For example, President Kenntdy was initally threatened oy the prospect that the Soviets might introdu:e offensive weapons Into Cuba. On September 4th and again on the 13th, Kennedy warned the Soviet Union that his adminis.ration would not tolerate such a move. These warnings probably served multiple functions..-domestic and foreign, but they were undoubtedly Intended :o deter the Soviets from taking any unwise action. The threat dynamic precipitating Kennedy's sequential attempts to deter the Soviet Union was substantially changed after Intelligence analysts -tudled the films of a single U-2 surveillance plane taken Juring an overfli.ht on October 14i. Now the President was confronted with the reality of the auverse future he had sought to deter. At that point the threat dy.iamic changed. The anticipated, unwanted condition was no longer the Introduction of such weapons, but the concern that they would become operational. Of necessity, the coping strategy changed from deterring the Soviets to persuading them to "undo" whdt they had already done (George, Hall (' Simons, 1971, 214) .
2. What is the "threat content" of the Interaction sequences, between the antatonists during the pre-crisis period?
The "Lhreat content" question is subdivided to account for two fundamental elements of a threat situation: the perceptional and the behavioral. (Holsti, 1965) and the Cuban missile crisis (Holsti, 1n72) is a rather standard stimulus-response model where the perceptions of decision makers serve to mediate between the external stimuli and the decision making unit's response.
I1
the decision making framework adopted in the Stanford Studies, perceptions serve the very vital role of defining the situation (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, 1962; Pruitt, 1955, 391-432; March & Simon, 1958) . In an overall sense a perceptual component of any threat recognition rescarch Is analytically unavoidable. "Threat as perception" provides a necessary conceptual apparatus to explain a system's sequential accommodations to a ser!es of events that are not particularly disturbing by objective standards, but are responded to as if they were. When the perception of threat is a causally determining behavioral factor, systems are expected to behave as though they were threatened despite the existence of evidence to the contrary. "Threat as behavior" focuses on the stimulus events that cue harm or are harm producing. Through learning certain events, sequences or configuration of events are " --
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associated with danger and adversity. The Inference from these events to the idea that Injury, even rt,!r, approaches is both reasonable and direct. The content of the events and/or the sequence of events has an 'endangering' quality to them. They threaten the target system. In contrast to the threat as a perceptual variable, threat as behavior Is a relatively unexplored concept. While It Is true that deterrence and game theorists (Kahn, 1960; Snyder, 1961; WohlsteLter, 1959; Schelling, 1963 ) have elaborated extensively on the threat concept, their insigh, are restricted to a particularized sense of the term and are operative under rather special circumstances. There is little douot that these insights have wider application in
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international relations research, but to-date the task has not been performed. Similarly in the study of crises, both general and internatioral, definitions of crisis frequently entail some threat element (Miller & Iscoe, 1963; Wiener & Kahn, 1962; 1972c) , but this fact has not lead to a well developed notion of threat behavior.
The theoretical proposition adopted to expand the thcat as behavior notion is that pre-crisis behavior will be characterized by marked changes from what is normal. Question 2.b seoks to determine whether significant differences exist between Interaction sequences during the pre-crisis period and a known behavioral baseline. The baseline is an empirically generated measure of the "steady state" In the system of action between antagonists. A system is a set of entities "standing in interaction" (Von ',ert3lanffy, 1956, 3), and the state of the system refers to a particular pattern of interaction between the entities. A state Is a "whollstic" notion and emerges as a signifigant unit of analysis is systems research. A steady state is one of many possible states of Interaction for a system; for present purposes, it Is the systemic condition of least disturbances and greatest constancy.
Theoretically the steady state is the system's stable region where the tendencies toward displacement and disturbance are countered by the forces of maintenance and stability (Berrien, 1068, 32) . The steady state baseline so.ves as an unobtrusive, objective measure of the "normal operating" mode of the system. It is a state In an international system or subsystem where th., volume of action is moderate, the conflictual forces are restrained and the cooperative elements balanced. The steady state represents the range of action least straining to the system. It persists so long as the variables, often called state variables, sustaining the stable condition are not forced out of the range of their stability. On this point, James G.
Miller (1971, 2)4) argues:
All living systems tend to maintain steady states (or homeostasis) of maniy variables, keeping an orderly balance among subsystems which process matter-energy or informption. Not only are subsystems usually kept in equilibrium, but systems also ordinarily maintain steady states with their environments and suprasystem3, which have outputs to the system and Inpt'ts from them. This prevents variations in the environment from destroying systems. This systems perspective endorses the definition of threat content In question 2.b as a disturvance In the steady state of behavior. Clearly, not all disturbances to a steady system of action are necessarily threatening. "Recognition of the meaning of the information of ... a threat rust be based of previosly stored (usually learned) information about such situations. A pattern of Input Information Is a threat when--like the odor of the hunter on the wind; a change in the acidity of fluids around a cell; a whirliig cloud approaching the city--It is capable of eliciting processes which can counteract the stress ir presages. Processes--actions or communications --occur in systems only when a stress or a threat has created a strain which pushes a variable beyond its range of stability" (Miller, 1971, 294e) Systems reasoning In International relations suggests thFat c-rises tend to be associated with states of systemic instability,--that Is disturbances to the steady 3tate. On this point Oran Young has written that political fluidity "frequently evoke(s) an air of political expectancy which creates in decision-makers a psychological receptivity to the possiblility of sh3rp breaks with the past. In this context crises often appear as short but Intense confrontations growing out of a merging in place and time of the disturbances just outlined" (1968,63) Crises are preceded and attended by disturbances in the system; they are products of, as well as catalysts for, international dislocations. Under extremly fluid, transitory political conditions crises tend to develop. Young extends his line of reasoning to the point of actually defining an international crisis as "a set of rapidly unfolding evrnts which raises the Impact of destabilizing forc-> in the general international system or any of Its subsysytem substantially above 'normal'... and increaseg the likelihood of violerce occurring In the system" (1967,10) McClelland's position is similar. ;n the "Aess to Berlin" study (1968), he bases the analysis of he Blockade Crisis of June, 19t48-May, 1949 , the Deadline Crisis of November 1958-ray, 1959, and the Berlin Wall Crisis of August 1q61 on the premise that a crisis can be distinguished from a non-crisis situation because the crisis is a "change of state in the flow of international political actions" (1968, 160) The change Is s;-nifigant enough to be readily detected and reveals a "st:arp break" has occurred In the pr-eva-ling pattern of behavior in favor of a new pattern. Systems theory logic holds that the state-variables supporting the steady state system of action are significantly altered to the point that they dramatically rearrange t.:e relationships between the Interaction entities. Empirical evidence in international crisis research (McClelland, 1 72, 90, 96 Jervis, 1971, 90-138; Janis, 1967; ) Is rich enough to sustain this basic argument and to warrant further research on more crises,--and especially the pre-crisis behavioral patterns.
The reason for tracking any sequence of events presumed to have some threat element associated with it is to know more about what combination of behavioral factors contributes to political explosions, and which do not. It is, therefore, not enough to describe the system of action, the perceived threat content or even how disturbed the system is from the normal range of behavior. Equally Important is the task of defining what strategies national systems take to handle the stress generated by the advent of adversity. Consequently, the third area of locus for this Inquiry is to determine the character of the adaptive behavior of national systems threatened with adversity.
Strategies of adaptation range from the simplest ways of dealing with minor problems to the most complex techniques for handling environmental change. Strategies vary from system to system. Lower forms of animal life rely he3vily on instinctive, built-in mechanisms for handling stress, variety and change. Systems higher on the phylogenetic scale of development are Increasingly dependent on learning as the source of Insplation in dealing with external stimuli. Pore advanced systems, human and human generated, frequently react more to the cues of dan-er rather than the danger itself. Through learning, advanced systems realize the disadvantages of attempting to deal with harm once it has actually occurred. Greater emphasis Is placed cn anticipating the harm, on reading environmental cues that project the likelihood of harm occurring. Cognition, Interpretatiort, symbols dnd learning play critical roles in determining how complex Fystems adapt to adverse environmental events.
Exactly hot., systems strike compromises with their environments is an !ntriguing question and it might be added, a very serious business. Primate field studies have shown the importance of biosocial adaptation to threatening environments. Non-human primate studies reveal the primary rile of group In maximizing the chances for survival for Individual animals. Studies of the Old Iorld monkey and African apes suggest that at no time can individual animals, living alone, handle the problems of the environment. Complex social systems exist among nor-human and humans to facilitate adapting. Hall (1965) provides one of many Illustrations of the Importance of the social system In adjusting to the environment. Pata monkeys, Erythrocebus patas, are physiologicaliy built for speed which permits them to adapt to life in the grasslands of Uganda riway from trees. When danger approaches a troop, the single, adult male, attracts attention to himself by his bright colors, jumping, screams and other techniques, and decoys the danger away from the troop. The young, lacking the s)eed t-, escape, and the females freeze In the tall grass 5nd play "possum" until the danger passes. Young animals practice decoy and possum behavior In their play thereby learning the system that contributes to their survival. The point is that speed alone does not Insure survival. The social structure of the group (one adult male with several female and their young), sleeping habits (troop members sleep separately), play behavior, speed, even the tall grass which permits possum behavior contribute to a successful adaptive behavior.
How national systems adapt to the International environment is as Intriguing and as serious as how pata monkeys adjust to the Uganda grasslands. According to Rosenau (1970, 365) environments are constantly changing resulting In "a threat to the Integrity and survival of the organism."
If national systems are to persist and grow, the argument holds, foreign policies must be enacted to adapt to the external environment. Adaptation depends on the maintenance of essential structures (Rosenau, 1970; Kaplan, 1957; Ashby, 1952) , on an Internal and external homeostasis or steady state (Ashby, 1952, 58-7n; Cannon, 1939; Seyle, 1956; Smelser, 1063; Grinker Pt Speigel, 1945; Arnold, 1960) , on vital information processing (Miller, 1965; Hamburg & Adams, 1967) , and autonomy (Angyal, 19l41, 49) . Adaptive behavior by national systems involves a diverse repertoire cf strategies to meet the variety of conditions In the envi ronment.
Adaptive behavior should be thouI t of as master concept. It covers all types of behavioral compromises and adjustme ts (French, Bodgers A Cobb, 1974, 316-333) . The primary concern of this inquiry is retricted, however, to a type of adaptive behavior,--namely coping. Coping behavior Is a class of adaptation exhibited by systems when faced with an acute disturbance or threatened vith one. Coping behavior occurs prior to and during highly stressful situations. Stressful situations are those Instances where environmental changes are sufficiently drastic to force the system to operate In a radically new environment. Crippling sicknesses, death of close relative, floods, storms, marriage, starting or graduating from school, exams, or business failure are all Instances that elicit coping behavior from individuals (Dohrenwend, 174, ). Collectives such as national political systems are similarly challenged by floods, storms, epidemics, mass migrations, panics, riots, revolutions, wars and International crises. Coping behavior refers to those strategies employed by systems threatened with or confronted by drastic changes In the environment that defy familiar response patterns, it Is adaptation under severe, short term, abnormal conditions. Coping is a temporary adjustment to an Inflamed, or potentially explosive situation.
The third and final research question of this study is concerned with the problem of identifying how national systems cope with threat situations.
3.
What copinr strategies do national systems adopt to meet undefined, unstructured situations that threaten adverse future confrontations?
It la reasonable to expect that national systems will engage In coping behavior only if the situation is disquieting and depreciating, or appraised that way. Coping strategies ara employed when management of a given situation exceeds the normal operating range of the system. New measures in greater amounts are tried to arrest a trend that is foreboding, unbearable and potentially ruinous.
The collective purpose of these research questions is to explore more thoroughly the pre-crisis behavior of national systems and to uncover the relationship between threat situations and International crises. (Evans, 1969; Smelser, 1963) ; nevertheless, it remains an Impediment to accumulating a thorough knowledge of how threat situations evolve into crises. To reduce the disadvantages of this fact Is a major goal of this undertaking.
"The aim of the sciences Is to diminish uncertainty about the world" (Katz, 1974, 394) . The aim here is to reduce some of the uncertainty surrounding how International Interactions pass from relatively benign states to "acute" crises.
It Is assumed that a partial reduction of uncertainty can be achieved 5y monitorinp t 2 pre-crisis Interaction of national systems to track the transition from the non-crisis to the crisis state.* The problems of monitoring the evniution of a non-crisis Oituation to a crisis one are severe. McClelland (1961) reminds u5 of the classical diplomatic historian's view that a crisis is Idiographic, and that the search for its pattern and regularity Is a useless undertaking. No amount of nomothetic analysis can generate comprehensive generalizations when each case appears to be sul generls with respect to Issue, actor, location, duration, tempo, role of third parties and superpower Involvement. The general structure of pre-crisis and crisis situations is highly ambiguous; it never seems developed enough to evaluate, least of all manage. It Is constantly changing and emerging. Crisis management and crisis preventive diplomacy must of necessity be context-dependent. They are contingent upon many unspecified variables which fluctuate over time (George & Smoke, 1q74, 50, 54) .
The problems of identifying similarities In particular cases are unquestionably sobering (Rosenau, 1968b; McGowan, 1975, 96) . Verba (1967) acknowledges that generalizations tend to vanish In particular cases. Immensely complicated social processes frequently cloud the general dynamics at work In unique cases. The varlet, of crises selected for analysis do not constitute a sample of post-war crises, but they are sufficiently alike, meaning they are members cf the same class of phenomena (Kalleberg, 1966) , to warrant comparisons, to permit empirical probes (Eckstein, 1S75), and to specify what similarities exist amidst the diversity (Rcbinson, 1972. 23 
